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Contemporary accounts of logic and language cannot give proper treatments
of plural constructions of natural languages. They assume that plural
constructions are redundant devices used to abbreviate singular
constructions. The paper aims to develop an account of logic and language
that acknowledges limitations of singular constructions and recognizes
plural constructions as their peers. To do so, the paper presents natural
accounts of the logic and meaning of plural constructions that result from
the view that plurals are, by and large, devices for talking about many
things (as such). The account of logic presented in the paper surpasses
contemporary Fregean accounts in its scope. This extension of the scope of
logic results from extending the range of languages that logic can directly
relate to. Underlying the view of language that makes room for this is a
perspective on reality that locates in the world what plural constructions
can relate to. The paper suggests that reflections on plural constructions
point to a broader framework for understanding logic, language, and reality
that can replace the contemporary Fregean framework as this has replaced
its Aristotelian ancestor.
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e-mail$B!'([email protected]
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